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Abstract
Biological invasions are an economic problem. Invasions are typically the intended or unintended
consequence of economic activity. They impose real costs on society, and the risk of invasion depends
on human behaviour. Effective control of invasions depends on using the right economic instruments
and developing the right institutions. The problem has two special features. The first is that the risks of
invasions may be very low, but the potential costs are high. Since they are not reflected in market prices,
they are typically ignored. The second is that the control of potentially invasive species is a public good
of the ￿weakest link￿ variety. Both features indicate a precautionary approach. To deal with the first, I
recommend the use of environmental assurance bonds to cover society against the risks of invasive
species whilst providing importers with an incentive to research the consequences of their actions. To
deal with the second I recommend the development of an institution similar to the Atlanta Centre for
Disease Control to provide the information and technical advice required if governments are to act, and
a central organisation (involving UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank) to strengthen eradication, control
of mitigation campaigns in those countries least able to deal with invasive species.
Biological invasions: the economic
problem
It is curious that a phenomenon that is attracting so much
attention from ecologists (Enserink, 1999) and
environmental organisations (UNEP, 1999) should have
received so little attention from economists. While there are
many studies of the costs and benefits of programmes for
the control of particular weeds, pests and pathogens, there
are no generic studies of the economics of biological
invasions. Research under the GISP programme (Perrings
et al., 2000) has identified some of the key points at issue,
but the agenda is still wide open. This paper proposes
preliminary answers to two questions. The first is how does
economics alter our perspective on biological invasions.
The second is what does economics offer by way of solutions
to the problems posed by biological invasions.
There are only two estimates of the aggregate cost of
invaders at the national level, both relating to the USA.
These are US OTA (1993) and Pimentel et al. (1999). The
difference between them reflects the growth in concern
over the problem. Seven years ago the US OTA estimated
the damage costs from 79 particularly harmful species over
the preceding 85 years to be $96,994 million. Last year
Pimentel et al. estimated the annual damage costs from all
species to be $122,639 million. While we are probably not
much wiser about the true net costs of invasions, we do
know that they are important enough for policy makers to
take the problem seriously. We also have a better idea of
where the costs lie.
It is clear is that invasive species have impacts beyond
pests and pathogens in agriculture, forestry or fisheries.
They are, for example, thought to be one of the main
proximate causes of biodiversity loss worldwide (Glowka,
1994; Wilcove et al., 1998; Czech and Krausman, 1997).
This has threatened key ecological functions in many
systems, and has had far reaching implications for many
other activities (Holling, 1992; Heywood, 1995). We also
know that most ecosystem types ￿ terrestrial, fresh-water
and marine, animal plant and microbe ￿have been impacted
to a greater or less extent by invasions (Parker at al., 1999;
Williamson, 1998, 2000).
To date, relatively little work has been done on the
economic implications of these more general impacts. WhileLand Use and Water Resources Research
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there are reasonable estimates of the financial costs of
herbicide control for plant species in a small number of
countries, there are few estimates of damage or control
costs for most invasive species (Williamson, 1998).
Examples include estimates of the potential control costs of
the screw worm fly, Chrysomya bezziana, in Australia
(Anaman et al., 1994); the benefits from clearing alien
species from Fynbos ecosystems in South Africa (Higgins
et al., 1997); the impact of Knapweed and Leafy Spurge on
the economy of several US states (Bangsund et al., 1999);
the damages to North American and European industrial
plants from the zebra mussel and other invaders (Khalanski,
1997); and the impact of the green crab, Carcinus maenas,
on the North Pacific Ocean fisheries (Cohen et al., 1995).
But these studies do no more than scratch the surface.
At one level, biological invasions are very obviously an
economic problem. They are an example of anthropogenic
environmental change. Invasions are typically the intended
or unintended consequence of economic activity. They
impose real costs on society, and the risk of invasion
depends on human behaviour. The regulation or control of
invasions should clearly involve economic analysis and
economic instruments whether we are concerned with the
exploitation of ecosystems ￿ by agriculture, forestry and
fisheries ￿ or with their conservation.
The reasons are quite straightforward. We need to
understand the incentive effects of existing institutional,
regulatory and market conditions if we are either to make
predictions about invasive species or to develop policies for
their control. We need to understand the cost effectiveness
or efficiency of publicly funded eradication, control or
mitigation options if we are to avoid waste. But we also
need to understand the limitations of economic instruments
for dealing with the class of problems to which biological
invasions belong. More than most other environmental
problems, biological invasions expose the limitations of
economics. The nature of the risks of invasions and the
impact of invasions on ecosystem functioning and economic
production limit the effectiveness of many tools of economic
analysis and instruments of economic control.
Having said that biological invasions are an economic
problem, let me add immediately that this does not mean
that the problem can be analysed in terms of economics
alone ￿ any more than it can be analysed in terms of
ecology alone. To understand the implications of invasions
for human welfare we need to specify an appropriate
￿production function￿ describing the relationship between
inputs and outputs (Perrings, Folke and M￿ler, 1992).
Individual species in an ecosystem are conceptualised as
inputs to the production of useful goods and services via a
set of ecological functions and processes. Their value, like
the value of other inputs, derives from the value of the
goods and services they support. This implies an analysis
that is as much ecological as economic.
Invasions are an outcome of a very complex set of
processes. The causes of invasions include the use of exotic
species in a wide range of economic activities, the conversion
and fragmentation of habitat, the liberalisation/deregulation
of markets, the expansion in the trade of goods and services
and the increasing mobility of people (Dalmazzone, 2000).
Many of these processes typically confer significant local
benefits. The potential costs of invasions should be assessed
against such benefits. The difficulty for economics stems
from the fact that invasions typically involve low probability
events potentially leading to fundamental change in
ecosystem functions, and that this may impose very high
costs on local resource users. Technically, this implies that
the relevant production sets are non-convex and that the
expected utility approach to decision-making under
uncertainty ￿ the conventional approach ￿ fails to predict
the decisions that people actually make in such
circumstances.
One of the major ￿risks￿ associated with invasions is that
by altering biodiversity, ecosystems may be transformed
into new configurations with unknown consequences for
human welfare. Biodiversity helps to maintain ecological
services in the face of variable environmental conditions
(Holling et al, 1995). In this sense it has indirect value: the
value of ecological resilience. Invasions have the potential
to cause loss of resilience. Moreover, like the spread of
infectious disease, invasions also require control that is
effective everywhere. Because the control of invasions is in
the nature of a public good, it will in any event be under-
provided by the market. Its similarity to the spread of
infectious disease means that the protection provided to all
will only be as good as the protection provided by the least
effective member of the community. The paper discusses
the implications of both features for the economics of
eradication, control or mitigation, and suggests mechanisms
for dealing with them.
Vulnerability to invasion: economic
aspects
Ecosystems vary in their susceptibility to invasion. Deserts,
semi-deserts, tropical dry forests and woodlands, temperate
systems and pelagic marine systems appear to be least
susceptible, while mixed island systems, lake, river and
near-shore marine systems appear to be most susceptible
(Heywood, 1995). Similarly, systems with low diversity ￿
especially if they are without existing predators or
competitors ￿ appear to be more susceptible than systems
with high diversity (RejmÆnek, 1989). But susceptibility
also depends on human behaviour, land use, demographic,
market and institutional structures, the regulatory framework
and the control strategies adopted. Habitat fragmentation,
habitat conversion and agricultural disturbance are all argued
to have increased the susceptibility to invasion (Williamson,
1996, 1999).
Indeed, the key to understanding the problem in any
given country involves understanding the way that human
behaviour and invasive species interact. Human behaviour
reflects the incentives, institutions and regulatory framework
￿ usually quarantine and the prohibition of blacklisted
species ￿ within which people make decisions (Perrings et
al., 2000). It makes it difficult to identify the probabilities
attaching to different outcomes on the basis of the
characteristics of species or their habitat alone. The spread
of potentially invasive species depends on the use that
people make of invasive species, on their predators and
competitors, on demographic patterns, on transport networks
and the like.
The structure and trade dependence of an economy both
turn out to be important in determining its vulnerability. In
a preliminary study, Dalmazzone (2000) considers the
relation between the establishment of alien plant species in
29 countries, trade flows and their composition, arable,Land Use and Water Resources Research
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pastoral and forested land, and other socio-economic
variables. She finds that economic activities can increase
the inherent susceptibility of ecosystems. Specifically, the
variables affecting the recipient environment (land tenure,
level of GDP, population density) are responsible for
explaining a high proportion of the variation in the share of
alien species in different countries. All ecological
communities are susceptible to invasion to some degree.
Economic activities can increase the susceptibility of most.
Trade has a weaker though still significant impact on the
share of alien species hosted by any given country.
Preliminary results also add some insight into the problem
of biological invasions on islands. Island ecosystems are
generally considered highly susceptible to invasions because
of a particularly vulnerable native biodiversity. But island
states are also typically, on average, small open economies,
often geared to the production of primary products. The
average percentage of merchandise imports as a share of the
GDP, in the sample considered, is about 43% for island
countries, against an average 32% for the whole sample,
and 26.8% for continental countries. Island states are not
only more susceptible ecologically, they are much more
open in terms of the movement of goods and services across
ecological boundaries.
Some interactions between human behaviour and
biological invasions are quite intuitive. For example, the
probability of establishment of intentionally introduced
species is higher than that of unintentionally introduced
species. One reason is that intentionally introduced species
have been selected for their ability to survive in the
environment where they are introduced (Smith et al., 1999).
Another is the link between intentional and repeated
introduction. Exotic species that are marketed over a period
of time have a greater probability of establishment than
those that are marketed once (Enserink, 1999). The
probability of both establishment and spread also depends
on the way in which the environment is altered by human
behaviour. The introduction of specific disease or pest
resistant crops, for example, selects in favour of other pests
and predators in a way that is well ￿ understood (Heywood,
1995).
The main implication of this is that the risks of invasions
depend on human responses to the threat of invasions.
Shogren (2000) makes the point that decision-makers protect
themselves against the risks of invasive species in two
related ways: by mitigation and by adaptation. Mitigation
includes the conventional categories of eradication and
control, and has the effect of reducing the likelihood that a
species will establish or spread. Adaptation, on the other
hand, implies some change in behaviour to reduce the
impact of the establishment and spread of a species. That is,
it works on the value of the effect, rather than the likelihood
of the effect. Nonetheless, mitigation and adaptation jointly
determine the risks and the costs of invasions. He concludes
that if mitigation and adaptation are linked in this way, then
economic and environmental systems are jointly determined.
Risk assessment and risk management cannot be handled
separately (Shogren and Crocker, 1991).
A good example lies in the interaction between human
behaviour and the spread of pathogens. Delfino and Simmons
(2000) model the spread of tuberculosis in developing
economies. They show that while the probability of infection
influences human decisions in a way that is quite
straightforward, the interactions between the virulence of a
disease, infected and susceptible populations, the pattern of
settlement and the level of development, may be very
complex. The relation between the level of economic
development, the epidemiology of an invasive pathogen,
and human settlement and migration, may lead to any one
of a number of possible states depending upon the parameter
values. They also show that while the spread of disease is
affected by the private costs and benefits of the options
facing people, and so may be influenced by economic
incentives, people typically ignore the impact of their
decisions on the infection risks to others.
The importance of this last point is that there is a public
good element in the control of the risks of disease, just as
there is in the control of invasive species generally. If left to
the market, disease and pest control will both be ￿under-
supplied￿. In fact the market prices of potentially invasive
species seldom reflect the costs they may impose on society.
That is, invasions are typically external to the market. Nor
is this helped by the fact that many markets have been
prevented from operating efficiently by agricultural policies
and institutions. Tax, price and incomes policies have all
increased the susceptibility of agroecosystems to invasion.
For example, subsidies designed to promote the export of
cash crops has reduced plant genetic diversity and
encouraged the use of farm inputs ￿ especially pesticide
regimes ￿ in a way that has laid agroecosystems open to
invasion (Perrings, 2000). Property rights regimes have
discouraged individuals from taking action to control
invading species. Land in common property, for example,
requires collective action, and open access land militates
against any action at all (Hanna, Folke and M￿ler, 1997).
More important still is the nature of the public good. The
control of invasive species in agriculture and forestry, like
the control of communicable diseases, depends on the least
effective member of the community. Put another way, the
public good involved in the control of infectious diseases
and many other invasive species is of the ￿weakest link￿
variety (Sandler, 1997). If control of an invasive plant
involves eradication campaigns in all nations sharing access
to the affected system, that control will only be as good as
the campaign run by the least effective nation. The risks to
all depend on the capacity of the weakest. This makes the
fact that capacity is falling in many countries a matter for
real concern. Falling barter and income terms of trade for
many of the poorest countries have limited the resources
available to control the effects of invasions, thus raising the
risks to all (Perrings et al., 2000).
Assessing the risks of invasions in a
ecological-economic system
If vulnerability to biological invasions depends as much on
the economic system as it does on the ecological system,
then the risks of invasion should be calculated accordingly.
However, the inclusion of social as well as natural effects
compounds the problems in assessing the risks of invasions.
Not only does human behaviour determine the risks of
establishment and spread, the social significance of those
risks depends on the value placed by society on the
consequences. Very few established alien species impose
sufficient costs to be defined as serious pests, but those that
do can be very serious indeed. The decision problem
reflects the fact, as has already been noted, that biologicalLand Use and Water Resources Research
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invasions fall into the category of low-probability events
but with a high potential cost.
The probability that any one introduced species will
establish and become a pest or pathogen is low. Williamson￿s
(1996) ￿tens rule￿ ￿ that 1 in 10 introduced species may be
found in native habitats, but that only 1 in 10 of those
establishes, and only 1 in 10 of those becomes a pest ￿
indicates that the probability is in the order of 0.01%.
At the same time, the control and/or damage costs of
species that do become significant pests or pathogens may
be extremely high. Pimentel et al.￿s (1999) estimate of costs
of $122 639 million to the USA per year is high enough. But
consider that in relation to just one invasive species that is
not typically included in the analysis, HIV, and it does not
look disproportionate. The cost of the latter in terms of the
social disruption it has caused, output lost from morbidity
and mortality amongst the young, research and development
into treatment options and so on is not known, but is
certainly a significant percentage of global NNP. The cost
of most plant pests and pathogens is dwarfed by comparison.
Nevertheless, these costs are still substantial. The annual
control costs for field bindweed in one state in the US, for
example, is estimated to be over $40 million (FICMNEW,
1998). Deliberate introductions that have yielded some
very substantial direct benefits have also had incidental
costs that may be very high. The introduction of the Nile
Perch into Lake Victoria, for example, is thought to have
resulted in the elimination of some 200 haplochromine
cychlid species (Kasulo, 2000).
A standard economic analysis of control in cases such as
these depends on estimation of the expected values for the
costs and benefits of control options.1 This makes it possible
to calculate an expected net present value and the options
can then be compared according to that (or a number of
related) yardsticks. However, the empirical evidence is that
decision-makers do not behave in this way. Estimates of the
probability of an undesirable outcome and of the costs of
that outcome both tend to be biased.
Empirical research has shown that individual decisions
in the face of risk are usually based on a reference point ￿
generally the status quo ￿ and that outcomes are assessed
relative to that (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The weight
given to a loss is often greater than the weight given to a gain
of the same amount. This implies that utility functions are
steeper for losses than for gains. People systematically
choose the less risky outcome in a direct choice (reveal a
higher willingness to pay for it), but place a higher value on
the more risky outcome (reveal a higher willingness to
accept compensation for it) if they were to sell it.
An extreme form of this, relevant to invasive pests or
pathogens, is the ￿dread￿ effect. This increases the subjective
risk assessments of certain types of health risk (McDaniels,
Kamlet and Fischer, 1992). It also affects people￿s valuation
of those risks. People are willing to pay much more for risk-
reduction measures in infrequent high dread situations,
than in frequent low dread situations (Loomis and du Vair,
1993). Moreover, individual attitudes to risk are highly
sensitive to income. It has long been known that people tend
to be risk averse at low levels of income and risk avid or risk
loving at high levels of income (Friedman and Savage, 1948).
The expected value approach has less and less predictive
power as the probabilities of outcomes tend to zero. People
facing a ￿very unlikely￿ event tend either to overestimate
the probability or to identify it with zero. For very low
probabilities the weighting function is often not defined. In
the liability insurance markets for low probability high cost
risks, for example, insurers typically demand a risk premium
that exceeds the expected losses whilst the insured are
willing to pay less than predicted by expected utility
calculations (Katzman, 1988).
Historically, many evaluations of control options have
calculated the ex post benefit-cost ratios for either successful
invaders or effective controls. This is tantamount to
calculating the ex post value of a winning lottery ticket. It
tells nothing about the efficiency of the original decision to
buy the ticket. It cannot guide ex ante decisions about when
to control and when not to control. Nor can it guide the
choice between control options. But even if the calculation
were to be based on an ex ante analysis of costs and benefits,
then as in the case of lotteries, decision-makers would be
found to behave in a way that is simply not rational according
to the expected utility approach.
Consider, for example, the method for evaluating
screening procedures for potentially invasive species
discussed by Smith, Lonsdale and Fortune (1999). They
define the value of the costs of control (through screening)
to be the product of three factors: (a) the accuracy of the
control (the screening process), (b) the probability that a
species will be invasive, and (c) the cost of screening error.
The accuracy of a screening process is the proportion of
species that have, ex post, been found to be appropriately
dealt with in the screening process: namely the proportion
of invaders assessed that are rejected by the process, and the
proportion of non-invaders assessed that are accepted by
the process. From these is derived a likelihood ratio for the
screening process. The effectiveness of a screening system
is then given by the product of the likelihood ratio, the
probability that an introduced species will become a pest,
and the cost if it does.
The first of these depends on the probability that the
introduced species escapes to become a casual species, the
probability that a casual species will naturalise, and the
probability that the naturalised species will become a pest.
In general this is very low ￿ as the tens rule suggests ￿
although it has been noted to be as high as 17% for some
weedy species from some bioclimatic zones (Lonsdale,
1994). The probability that an introduced species will
become a pest may be expressed as the ratio of the probability
that an accepted invasive species will impose economic
costs (will be a pest), and the probability that an accepted
non-invasive species will confer economic benefits (will
not be a pest). Similarly, the expected cost of pests, may be
expressed as the ratio of the expected costs of accepting an
invasive species that turns out to be a pest and the expected
costs of rejecting a non-invasive species that turns out not
to be a pest.
In terms of the notation in Smith et al. (1999), the test for
the screening process to be acceptable is thus:
1 This is based on the expected utility hypothesis. It holds that people evaluate a
risky prospect in terms of the mathematical expectation of the value or utility to
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The numerator is the product of the proportion of potential
invasives rejected by the control, Ir/It, the probability of a
potential invasive doing damage, Ri, and the expected cost
if it does, Ki. The denominator is the product of the proportion
of potential non-invasives rejected by the control, Nr/Nt, the
probability of a potentially non-invasive species yielding
benefits Rn,2, and the expected net benefits of non-invasives,
Kn.
In expected present value terms the test requires that the
expected present value of the benefits of the screening
process (the net costs avoided by the screening programme)
are no less than the expected present value of the costs of
control (the foregone benefits of the screening programme).
In other words, under the expected utility hypothesis this
ratio should approximately equal the ratio of expected
discounted benefits and costs of the screening programme.
In the case of low-probability high-cost events such as
invasions, however, the ratio is likely to be very different
from the expected discounted benefits and costs of control.
That is:
where Bit ￿ Cit are the net benefits of the exclusion of
potentially invasive species at time t, Bnt ￿ Cnt are the net
costs of excluding non-invasive species, and r is a discount
factor. The ￿dread￿ effect is likely to bias upwards private
estimates of the costs if a potentially invasive species
becomes a pest, while the low probability of outcomes is
likely to induce a distortion in the perception of risk.
Biological invasions and economic
control
A related problem for the economics of invasive species
stems from the effects of invasions on ecosystem dynamics.
Invasive species are typically defined to be those whose
impacts involve the transformation of a system. Examples
already referred to include pines in the South African
fynbos, Brazilian pepper and melaleuca in the Florida
everglades, cheatgrass and leafy spurge in the western
USA, rabbits in Australia, the Nile perch and water hyacinth
in the African lakes. Naturalised species that are present in
an ecosystem, but are innocuous, tend not to be defined as
invasive. The trigger to the recognition of species as invasives
is that at some point they bring about a rapid and persistent
change in the state of the system.
Most ecological systems are characterised by multiple
equilibria. Much is known in particular cases about the
factors that cause systems to flip from one equilibrium state
to another. Well known examples include the role of the
spruce budworm in boreal forests (Jones, 1975; Ludwig,
Jones and Holling, 1978), and of herbivores in semi-arid
savannas (Walker and Noy-Meir, 1982; Walker, 1988;
Westoby et al., 1989). In both cases there is a marked
hysteresis effect. The initial change in states tends to be
rapid, but the path back to the initial state tends to be very
slow. In the spruce budworm case, for example, equilibrium
budworm numbers are initially low but at a certain point
increase very rapidly with dramatic effects on forest
dynamics. The return to lower budworm densities is much
slower (Ludwig, Walker and Holling, 1997).
If a system flips from one state to another, it may be said
to have lost resilience. Invasive species accordingly tend to
be defined as such only if they induce a loss of resilience in
the ecosystem concerned. Loss of resilience means both an
increase in the time taken to return to equilibrium following
some shock (Pimm, 1984), and a narrowing of the range of
environmental conditions over which the system can
maintain the flow of ecosystem services (Holling, 1973). If
changes of state that affect the productivity of a system are
either irreversible or only slowly reversible, they impose
costs or confer benefits on both present and future users of
that system. Resilience, sensu Holling, is a measure of the
size of the stability domain corresponding to an attractor or
equilibrium, or a measure of the ability of a system to
maintain its ￿integrity￿ or ￿health￿ in the face of stresses or
shocks (Costanza, Norton and Haskell, 1993). By changing
both the function and species diversity of ecosystems,
biological invasions change their value to people. The link
between resilience, diversity, risk and productivity is still
disputed in ecology, but experimental research on grasslands
has now shown that long-term ecosystem productivity falls
significantly with a reduction in plant biodiversity (Tilman
and Downing, 1994; Tilman et al., 1996).
Agroecosystems, including plantation forests, turn out
to be especially sensitive to invasions and the consequent
loss of native species precisely because they are already
simplified by the exclusion of competitor or predator species
(Conway, 1993). The simplification of agroecosystems
typically leads to a reduction in their resilience. The costs
of a loss of resilience in such systems is relatively easy to
calculate. It includes, for example, the cost of the herbicides,
pesticides, fertilisers, irrigation and other inputs needed to
maintain output in the simplified system. In extreme cases
it also includes the cost of relief where output fails, relocation
where soils or water resources have been irreversibly
damaged, rehabilitation where damage is reversible and
insurance against crop damage by pest or disease (Brock et
al., 2000).
Two things are important here. I have already remarked
that if a system can flip from one state to another if
sufficiently perturbed it implies the non-convexity of the
￿production sets￿. This turns out to have far-reaching
consequences for the way we think about the economics
and management of natural resources. It may imply the non-
controllability or non-observability of the system. Decision-
makers may not be able to ￿see￿ the system through, for
example, market prices, and may not be able to control its
dynamics using the instruments available. A corollary of
this is that the effects of introducing new species may be
fundamentally uncertain. It may also mean either hysteresis
or irreversibility in the state dynamics. A system that flips
from one state to another at some set of prices may require
a very different set of prices to return it to the original state
(M￿ler, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999).
Moreover, the closer the system is brought to the
boundaries of the stability domain, the greater the risk that
the introduction of an alien species may result in irreversible
or persistent change as the system flips from a higher
2 It is usually assumed that the probability of a potentially non-invasive species
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productivity state to a lower productivity state. In most
cases, however, the observable level of environmental
quality or productivity is a poor indicator of where the
environment is relative to the thresholds between states.
The fact that bifurcation points may not be seen until they
are reached is a problem for both the economics and
management of species introductions.
Institutions and incentives for the control
of biological invasions
Where does this leave the economic control of biological
invasions? Note that even if ecological systems are neither
observable nor controllable through economic instruments,
they may still be ￿stabilised￿ (Perrings, 1991). What this
means is that economic instruments may be used to restrict
pressure on the ecological system so that it can continue to
function over the expected range of environmental
conditions. That is, economic instruments can be used to
protect the resilience of the ecological system. This involves
the use of ecologically sensitive ￿safe minimum standards￿
(Bishop and Ready, 1991) supported by appropriate
economic incentives. Instruments that safeguard the range
of future options by protecting thresholds of resilience are
generally defined as sustainability constraints.
The stabilisation of ecological-economic systems
through the application of sustainability constraints implies
a precautionary approach. The precautionary principle holds
that where the effects of some activity are uncertain, but are
potentially both costly and irreversible, society should take
action to limit those effects before the uncertainty is resolved.
The rationale for the principle is generally that the
conjectured costs of not taking action are much greater than
the known costs of preventative or anticipatory action
(Taylor, 1991). This is partly just the notion that an implicit
benefit cost analysis of activities with highly uncertain
environmental effects should ￿err on the side of caution￿.
But there is another side to the precautionary approach.
Costanza  et al. (1998) argue that where an activity is
potentially damaging, the burden of proof should lie with
those whose activities are the source of damage. That is, it
is also a principle about who should bear the burden of
proof.
Because the general problem of biological invasions,
like the more specific problem of the spread of communicable
diseases, depends on the independent decisions of millions
of individuals, the control of that problem requires
instruments and institutions that alter the incentives they
face. These should reflect differences in the level of
uncertainty, and the potential cost of the establishment and
naturalisation of invasive species. Some introductions are
entirely accidental. The spread of communicable diseases,
for example, is seldom deliberate. However, most
introductions involve deliberate imports to support
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Yet market prices for
seeds, foods, fibres, pesticides and fertilisers do not generally
reflect the ecological risks associated with their use. It
follows that farmers have little incentive to take account of
costs such as the deletion of indigenous species through
predation, browsing or competition; genetic alteration of
indigenous species through hybridisation; or the alteration
of biogeochemical, hydrological and nutrient cycles, soil
erosion and other geomorphological processes.
What are required are instruments that (a) protect key
thresholds where the costs of crossing those thresholds are
uncertain but are conjectured to be high and/or irreversible,
and (b) confront people with the full cost of their behaviour
wherever the risks are known. This implies a regulatory
regime to protect key species, habitats and ecological
services by controlling the introduction of potential invaders;
an appropriate set of property rights in natural resources
(along with their supporting institutions); a compensation
mechanism; and a supporting structure of incentives and
disincentives to induce the desired response. The instruments
will typically differ for the ex ante control of species
introductions and the ex post control of introduced species
that have become invasive.
Because of the public good nature of strategies to
protect ecological services, environmental authorities might
be expected to insist on higher levels of environmental
protection than would be provided by the market. But
because the introduction of exotic species may also yield
substantial benefits, environmental authorities would not
be expected to insist on total protection. Although the
potential irreversibility of the costs of invasions and
uncertainty over damages both indicate a precautionary
approach to the control of introductions, this does not imply
the exclusion of all non-indigenous species.
Maintaining biodiversity in agroecosystems by
precluding the introduction of crop species that displace
traditional crops would certainly reduce the risks of
biological invasions. It might also reduce the risks of crop
failure. Higher levels of genetic diversity in cultivated
crops and wild relatives generally means that yields can be
maintained over a wider range of environmental conditions.
Indeed, the genetic simplification of agriculture and forestry
has already reduced the resilience of agroecosystems. More
than 90% of world food supply derives from a small number
of grasses (wheat, rice, corn and oats), nightshades (tomato
and potato), mammals (cattle, sheep and pigs), and birds
(chickens and ducks) (Heywood, 1995). The narrow genetic
base of the food supply means that it is highly susceptible
to disease and pest epidemics.
At the same time, preventing new introductions would
also entail substantial losses in welfare, especially if forgone
development benefits turn out to be high and the importance
of existing biodiversity turns out to be low. At least half of
the increase in agricultural productivity this century has
been attributed to artificial selection, recombination and
intraspecific gene transfer (Heywood, 1995). Enhanced
disease resistance avoids very substantial damage costs. To
take just one example, the use of Ethiopian barley to protect
Californian barley from dwarf yellow virus was valued at
$160 million a year in 1995. These are very substantial
benefits to forego. The exclusion of all exotics would
impose considerable costs on society.
What we should be looking for is a regime that allows
the social benefits of new introductions, whilst protecting
society from the associated risks. The difficulty with new
introductions is that the associated risks are generally
uninsurable commercially for the reason that they are
fundamentally uncertain and potentially very large. It is
impossible to compute such risks actuarially. At present the
risks of new introductions are typically born by the state in
the receiving country. They are limited only by the quantity
and effectiveness of resources committed to screening, and
the exclusion policy adopted. The effectiveness of theLand Use and Water Resources Research
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screening process in turn depends on the resources
committed to research into the consequences of the
establishment and naturalisation of introduced aliens. The
effectiveness of the exclusion policy depends partly on the
nature of the constraints (black list or white list), partly on
the resources committed to the detection and prosecution of
non-compliance, and partly on the incentive effects of the
penalty regime. Moreover, just as at the international level,
the effectiveness of the national system is only as great as
the effectiveness of the weakest link in that system.
It is, however, possible to make more constructive use
of incentives in this area. There are precautionary instruments
that can be used to protect society by altering the incentives
to importers. The environmental assurance bond is an
instrument that was developed to address the fact that,
without market incentives, experimental research conducted
by agents proposing innovative activities will not typically
include all relevant potential future costs (Perrings, 1989;
Costanza and Perrings, 1992). But because innovative
activities are historically unique there is no basis on which
to establish ex ante markets in all potential future effects.
Sequentially-determined environmental bonds offer
incentives to research the socially interesting outcomes of
innovative activities.
In the case of potentially invasive species, assurance
bonds would work in the following way. Importers of new
species or those undertaking high risk activities would be
required to post a bond equivalent to the conjectured
damage if the species was to establish, naturalise and
become a pest. This information might derive from the
national screening service. But it might also derive from a
central world or regional data/information source that could
operate for invasive species generally in the same way as
the Atlanta Centre for Disease Control operates for
communicable diseases.
The value of the bond would then be reassessed as
additional data on the environmental risks emerged. The
bond would be refunded if it could be shown that there was
no risk, or used to fund an eradication or control campaign
if the risks were realised. An environmental assurance bond
has the advantage that it both protects society and, by
shifting the burden of proof on to those responsible for the
introductions, it provides an incentive to research the
ecological consequences of introductions. The use of an
equivalent to the Atlanta Centre for Disease Control to
provide data on the risks of invasive species has the additional
advantage that it partly solves the problem of the weakest
link.
The most effective ex ante control regimes will still not
eliminate the risk of invasions. As in the case of screening
and the control of species imports, the effectiveness of
eradication, control or mitigation measures for introduced
species that do become invasive depends both on the
quantity and quality of public resources committed to these
measures, and on the structure of incentives. The latter
depends on an understanding of the way that human
behaviour and invasive species interact. I have already
made the point that is difficult to estimate the probabilities
attaching to different outcomes of some control strategy
solely on the basis of either the characteristics of species or
their habitat. The control of invasive species depends on
human behaviour, and the key element in any control
strategy is likely to be the regulation of human behaviour.
This may well imply the use of penalties to deter behaviour
that increases the risks of invasions, but it may also imply
the use of positive incentives to encourage behaviour that
reduces those risks.
In this case, however, even if the incentives are right, the
weakest link problem remains. The protection provided to
all will only be as good as the protection provided by the
weakest. This is a very practical problem with no ready
solution. While a central source of information on invasive
species may provide the data and technical advice to support
eradication, control or mitigation, it would not have the
resources to mount campaigns against particular invaders.
Nor, at present, would UNEP in isolation. In the absence of
a World Environment Organisation commanding sufficient
resources to fill this role, there seems to be little alternative
to the GEF sponsors, UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank.
They should be urged to consider the establishment of a
resource with the capability of protecting both global and
regional interests from the threat of Biological Invasions by
strengthening the weakest links in the chain.
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